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The Evolution of Compurgation and Jury Nullification 
JOSH PERLDEINER 
The ancient and medieval custom of compurgation, the clearing of 
one’s name by producing oath-helpers, has a long and colored past in 
Anglo-American law. Also known as the Wager of Law after the late-11th 
century and the Norman Conquest, this process made considerable 
concession to the knowledge and power of local communities; oath-helpers 
were generally peers, and were considered to know intimate details 
concerning the case for which they were called. This Note will show that, 
once compurgation had substantially vanished (whether before or after the 
Assize of Clarendon), the importance of locality did not simply cease, but 
rather carried on, taken up through the formal inquest procedure in 
England. From there, it made its way into the jury trial, which we may 
trace, insofar as English law is concerned, to the Assize of Clarendon, 
though it has its beginnings long before that in general European 
jurisprudence. 
The final instantiation of this transformative process from 
compurgation is the power of a jury to nullify. Though juries may no 
longer be composed of locals expected to know the law, they are still 
expected to embody some element of local custom. Though this is a highly 
contested issue amongst jurists, I argue that the power of nullification 
(open to abuse though it is), is conceptually integral in the way that the 
modern jury system functions since the other elements of vicinage, or 
locality, have been stripped out one by one as the State has grown more 
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The Evolution of Compurgation and Jury Nullification 
JOSH PERLDEINER* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Our society has grown used to the modern shape of trial, but that ritual 
and procedure has not been unchanging through the centuries. Ancient 
modes of trial differed in many substantial and often surprising ways from 
our own.1 The form taken by trial reflects the social organization of the 
society which created it.2 Our own “modern” modes of trial are inherently 
tied to the way in which our society is structured.3 Compurgation, or oath-
swearing, with which this article is concerned, is a fundamentally alien 
mode of proof and trial to us. However, its history is of great interest to 
many more “modern” modes. 
There has been much scholarly debate over where and when the 
practice of compurgation originated.4 What is certain is that it played a 
prominent role in the dispute resolution of a primarily familial society.5 
The same problems of historical descent are attendant on the 
                                                                                                                          
* 3rd-year law student at the University of Connecticut and certified legal intern at the 
Commission of the Public Defender, Middletown, Connecticut. Much of this research is indebted to 
Robin Fleming at Boston College and the Medieval Studies department there. 
1 In addition to the Germanic customs addressed infra, the practices of classical Roman trials, 
from which the Continental Inquisitorial style derives, were completely divorced from what most 
Americans or residents of the United Kingdom would consider trials; civil judges during the Republic, 
for example, were chosen by the mutual agreement of the parties’ patrons. LEOPOLD WENGER, 
INSTITUTES OF THE ROMAN LAW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 35 (Otis Harrison Fisk, trans., The Liberal Arts 
Press 1955). For records of Roman trials during the Republic see generally, MICHAEL C. ALEXANDER, 
TRIALS IN THE LATE ROMAN REPUBLIC, 149 BC TO 50 BC (1990). 
2 See generally, e.g., MICHEL CROZIER, THE BUREAUCRATIC PHENOMENON (2010) (arguing that 
bureaucratic institutions, such as trial courts, exist in a cultural context which gives them form). 
3 Id. 
4 This debate was at its most contentious around the end of the 19th century, when prominent 
classicists and medievalists (not to mention law scholars) attempted to trace the ethnic origins of 
various practices. See, e.g., Henry Campbell Black, Antiquities of the Law of Evidence—Compurgation, 
27 AM. L. REV. 498, 498–99 (1893) (arguing that the idea of the exculpatory oath is an idea 
fundamental to civilization, developed independently amongst many peoples, the oldest example of 
which can be traced to Mosaic law). However, to my knowledge, there has yet to be a satisfactory 
answer to this question. For one thing, compurgation appears to have been in use not only amongst 
Germanic peoples, but even, for a time, amongst Greeks and Romans. Id. at 499–501. Whether this 
points to a common source is difficult to determine at this remove. 
5 HENRY C. LEA, SUPERSTITION AND FORCE: ESSAYS ON THE WAGER OF LAW, THE WAGER OF 
BATTLE, THE ORDEAL, TORTURE 14–15 (2d rev. ed.) (1870). 
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traditional jury-right. Though some have described the jury as an 
outgrowth of the old Saxon custom of trial by the ealdorman, there has 
been considerable contest on that point.6 The most commonly accepted 
reasoning is that the jury trial actually only traces its roots back to the 12th 
century Assize of Clarendon, under Henry II.7 
Compurgation bears some hallmarks that make it appear to be, at first 
blush, somewhat like our conception of a jury trial.8 Indeed, there was a 
time during the 1870s and 80s when it was a common belief that the 
Anglo-American jury practice itself derived from the practice of oath-
swearing.9 Though the link between them may be dissolved by scholarship, 
there is a reason scholars thought our practice and oath-swearing were 
akin: both the medieval jury and the swearing of compurgators express a 
highly local concern with justice. That is, that justice need be done 
according to both local rule and local knowledge.10  
There is more to this link than meets the eye. In the Note following, I 
will make no attempt to reinstate the Victorian argument that the jury 
emerged from the ancient practice of compurgation. Rather, I will 
demonstrate that the practice of compurgation stems from the same basic 
need for local justice as the jury does. This concern with community 
judgment and local knowledge is reflected in the modern practice of 
criminal jury nullification, wherein a jury declares that notwithstanding the 
defendant’s guilt, they will not convict. The groundswell of local support 
in the face of the will of the state that undergirds jury nullification is 
inherently akin to the practice of compurgation, in which a number of oath-
helpers swear that the defendant did not commit the crime or delict, 
regardless of the factual circumstances underlying the charge. 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
6 See, e.g., J.E.R. Stephens, The Growth of Trial by Jury in England, 10 HARV. L. REV. 150, 150–
51 (1896) (encapsulating several positions). 
7 During which time Henry instituted a number of reforms to trial in England, namely shifting the 
systems of trial away from the classical trial by ordeal, battle, or compurgation, to an evidentiary 
model. THE ASSIZE OF CLARENDON, reprinted in SELECT CHARTERS AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS OF 
ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE REIGN OF EDWARD THE FIRST 
(William Stubbs ed., 1913) (Requiring twelve men of the region to determine who was entitled to 
property as one of its changes, leading to the civil petit jury and twelve free men to report of any crimes 
that had occurred in a region while the Assize was traveling circuit, which appears to be a type of 
indicting grand jury). 
8 The similarities between compurgation and the juror-witness model of the medieval jury have 
been much remarked on by various sources, most of them 19th century commentators. Any of the 
articles cited herein from the 19th century will give a good overview of this attitude. 
9 Stephens, supra note 6, at 154 (noting that this belief had fallen out of fashion at least by 1896, 
the time of that article’s publication). 
10 Mike Macnair, Vicinage and the Antecedents of the Jury, 17 LAW & HIST. REV. 537, 537–38 
(1999). 
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II. COMPURGATION 
The practice of compurgation has its origins somewhere in the mists of 
time.11 In form, compurgation consisted of a defendant, civil or criminal,12 
proving his innocence not by any evidentiary obligation, but rather by 
swearing that he did not commit the crime or delict. This oath required 
helpers—purgators—to swear together (to com purgare, literally to purge 
together, where com is an intensive Latin prefix) to the faithfulness and 
trustworthiness of the defendant.13 Victorians roundly criticized this form 
of proof as being barbaric, incomprehensible, and illogical.14 It is only in 
relatively recent years that sense has been made of what is, to us, a 
completely alien form of justice.15 
Compurgation reflects the society that produced it: one that was 
focused on kinship and blood ties. In the early Medieval world out of 
which compurgation grew, it was not uncommon for unresolved 
differences to erupt into blood-feuds.16 This type of conflict was costly and 
dangerous. It permitted essentially personal problems between two 
individuals to explode into widespread community violence.17 “Solidarity 
was an essential fact of tribal life.”18 The process of compurgation allowed 
one side on a potential feud to measure another. In its most basic form, 
                                                                                                                          
11 It appears at least as early as the Salic law code of the 5th century C.E. James B. Thayer, The 
Older Modes of Trial, 5 HARV. L. REV. 45, 58 (1891). It appears largely unchanged in the 13th century 
Custumal of Ipswich. See id.  
12 There was less difference between civil and criminal matters in the Classical and Medieval 
period, primarily due to the fact that the distinction between an action on behalf of the state and a 
personal trespass or delict was hazy at best and often nonexistent, leaving many crimes to be dealt with 
by an accuser bringing them forward in court. Black, supra note 4, at 505, 508; LEA, supra note 5. 
13 See MAURICE ALPHEUS BIGELOW, PLACITA ANGLO-NORMANICA, at xx (1879) 
(“Compurgation, in its essential features, consisted in the bringing forward of a definite number of 
persons, dependent upon the rank of the parties and the object of the suit, who were to swear, not to the 
facts, but to the credibility of the party for whom they appeared.”). 
14 WILLIAM ROBERTSON, 1 THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF EMPEROR CHARLES V, at 59 (Phillips, 
Sampson, & Co. 1859); T.F.T. PLUCKNETT, EDWARD I AND CRIMINAL LAW 69 (Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1960) (writing that the ordeal “can only be described as irrational” and that “[t]here was nothing 
rational about it”); see also R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, METHODS OF PROOF IN WESTERN MEDIEVAL LAW, 
IN LEGAL HISTORY: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 71 (Hambledon Press 1991) (typifying medieval trial 
as a “recourse to invisible forces . . . [and] renounciation of the reasoned investigation”). 
15 See generally H.L. Ho, The Legitimacy of Medieval Proof, 19 J.L. & RELIGION 259 (2003) 
(describing the social and faith-based aspects of compurgation, trial by ordeal, and trial by combat, as 
well as the mitigating factors of discretion and manipulation); see also Rebecca V. Colman, Reason 
and Unreason in Early Medieval Law, 4 J. INTERDISCIPLINARY HIST. 571 (1974); Peter Brown, Society 
and the Supernatural: A Medieval Change, 104 DAEDALUS 133 (1975). 
16 LEA, supra note 5, at 15. 
17 Id. “When ‘violent self-help and private warfare compete . . . with law’ as forms of social 
control, the court had to bring every dissension to a categorical close.” Ho, supra note 15, at 270 (citing 
Paul R. Hyams, Trial by Ordeal: The Key to Proof in the Early Common Law, in ON THE LAWS AND 
CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND—ESSAYS IN HONOR OF SAMUEL E. THORNE 90 (Morris S. Arnold et al. eds., 
U.N.C. Press 1981)). 
18 Ho, supra note 15, at 269. 
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families and kin-groupings could come together to examine each other, the 
plaintiff bringing his secta19 and the defendant bringing his purgators. This 
served as a safety valve, preventing dangerous conflicts from boiling over 
into the community. Seen in this light, compurgation no longer appears so 
childish. 
However, compurgation did not remain viable in the years following 
the Assize of Clarendon, save in ecclesiastical courts.20 Nearly 
contemporaneous with its disappearance was the rise of the criminal and 
civil jury in England. This section of the Note will explore first, in detail, 
the sources of compurgation in distant antiquity. Then, I will turn to the 
effects of compurgation on a society of kinship and feud. Lastly, I will 
conclude with the vanishing of compurgation altogether, making room for 
other methods of trial. 
A.  Sources of Compurgation in Germanic Law 
The very earliest written versions of compurgation appear to be 
contained in the Lex Salica, promulgated by Clovis, King of the Franks, in 
the late fifth or early sixth century of the Common Era.21 By the mid-
seventh century, the Edict of Rothari alluded to sacramentales, usually 
twelve in number, and by the end of that century so did the law of Ine of 
Wessex.22 Whether or not compurgation was truly in wide use before the 
codification of the laws of the Salian Franks in the Lex Salica as many 
earlier scholars suggest, it is certain that by the mid-sixth century it was in 
widespread use in continental Europe and, at least by the close of the 
seventh century, it was used in Wessex.23 
                                                                                                                          
19 Often called “complaint-witnesses” in the scholarly literature, the function of calling secta was 
to bypass the preliminary pleading stage as a proffer that the deed forming the basis of the action was 
true. Thayer, supra note 11, at 47–48. 
20 THE ASSIZE OF CLARENDON, supra note 7. 
21 See MAURIZIO LUPOI, THE ORIGINS OF THE EUROPEAN LEGAL ORDER 341–42 (Adrian Belton 
trans.) (1994) (“[O]ath-helping was a widespread institution, attested by the formularies and admitted 
in the first Frankish capitularies after the promulgation of the Salic law.”); see also GUY CARLETON 
LEE, HISTORICAL JURISPRUDENCE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF LAW 380–81 (1900) (“The characteristic of this code[, the Ripurian Law,] is greater 
minuteness of regulation than is found in the Salic Law as to compurgation and the number of 
compurgators.”). Purgatores were also found in the code of the Alamanni, and the Lombards. LEA, 
supra note 5, at 55. But see WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 305–08 (7th ed. 
1956) (tracing the history of compurgation back even farther, to the Roman period: “Though oaths 
were used in the Roman law of procedure, this institution of compurgation was not known to it. It was, 
however, common to the laws of many of the barbarian tribes who overran the Roman empire.”).  
22 LUPOI, supra note 21, at 342. These sacramentales seem to have served the same function as 
purgatores, though their name indicates that there is a conception of holiness or sanctity to their duty, 
perhaps indicating that they were made to swear on holy relics or to speak sacred formulae, as was 
sometimes the case in compurgation. 
23 Though not, interestingly, in Kent, where a contemporaneous law issued by King Wihtræd of 
Kent states that oaths are sworn only by the interested party (what have been termed secta above). Id. 
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Eventually, compurgation was available as a form of justice 
throughout England. It was contested by a new form of proof after the 
Norman Conquest, brought over by the invaders: trial by combat, which 
served many of the same ends as compurgation.24 However, oath-swearing 
had become, by that time, an institution available to all English freemen 
and trial by combat was reserved for the nobility, or at least the very 
wealthy.25 Compurgation was not finally extinguished until some time after 
the 13th century Assize of Clarendon forbade various older modes of trial 
in secular courts, though it may have persisted in ecclesiastical contexts.26 
B.  Social Effects of a Scheme of Compurgation 
The society which made use of compurgation was one in which bonds 
of blood and kinship were of paramount importance.27 Blood-feuds were 
common and extremely dangerous.28 This private action, this violent self-
help, led to the development of the compurgatory system by which kin-
groups could confront one another in a public place and determine whether 
or not they truly wished to go forward with the dangerous activity of the 
blood-feud.29 One of the effects of this scheme was to prevent repeat 
                                                                                                                          
Henry Campbell Black notes that “[a]mong the Salian Franks . . . it was considered a privilege and was 
restricted to the nobility, or was permitted to the ordinary freeman only in the exceptional case of his 
accuser’s assenting thereto.” Black, supra note 4, at 503. 
24 Thayer, supra note 11, at 65. Wager of battle appears to have been imported from the Frankish 
dominions by the Normans.   
25 Though the sources are confused on this point insofar as the Norman English dominion, the 
GRAND CHRONIQUES DE FRANCE presents us with a tantalizing view of trial by combat on the 
continent: “Saint Louis abolished battle in his country because it happened often that when there was a 
contention between a poor man and a rich man in which trial by battle was necessary, the rich man paid 
so much that all the champions were on his side and the poor man could find none to help him.” M. 
PAULIN, Paris, vol. 4, p. 427, 430, al. 3. 
In some ways, this mirrors the practice of retaining all available advocates by one party in a 
litigation, causing them to conflict out of serving the other party. 
26 Infra Part I.C. 
27 STEPHEN D. WHITE, RE-THINKING KINSHIP AND FEUDALISM IN EARLY MEDIEVAL EUROPE 
(2005). 
28 As evinced by the practice of the wergeld, or man-price (called botes or leodes in the Lex 
Salica), schedules of payments in silver to be paid for various offenses in order to prevent feud-right 
from attaching. G. LARRY MAYS & LATHAM THOMAS WINFREE, ESSENTIALS OF CORRECTIONS 34 
(2008). The Lex Salica provided “If anyone finds a man at a crossroads without hands and feet whom 
his enemies have left mutilated [and he kills him], he shall be liable to pay four thousand denarii.” THE 
LAWS OF THE SALIAN FRANKS 181 (Katherine Fischer Drew trans., 1991).  
This was, in essence, a restriction on interfering with a blood-feud as an outside party—it was not 
that the death was considered a murder, but that it was being stolen from the rightful side of the feud 
who had put him there in the first place. 
29 F.J.C. HEARNSHAW, LEET JURISDICTION IN ENGLAND ESPECIALLY ILLUSTRATED BY THE 
RECORDS OF THE COURT LEET OF SOUTHAMPTON 332–33 (H.M. Gilbert & Son 1908). Wergeld also 
served to bind actions to the community. See LEA, supra note 5, at 18 (“In its relations to the 
community, therefore, each family in the barbaric tribes was a unit, both for attack and defence, 
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offenders from having access to compurgation. Those members of a kin-
group who were brought before the hallmoot (or althing, or judicial body 
of whatever stripe) repeatedly would find their credit slowly degrading 
with their kindred.30 At some point, they would then be unable to produce 
the essential number of purgators to clear them. This served as a check on 
those chronically unable to avoid enraging, injuring, or damaging others.31 
An example of this judicial oath can be seen in an 1101 C.E. case where 
two bishops were the purgators of a brother prelate from a charge of 
simony in the consistory court—their oaths were simply, “I believe that 
Norgaud, Bishop of Autun, has sworn the truth. So help me God.”32 
This early Germanic judicial scheme was carried forward long after the 
tribal organizations that gave it birth and purpose had vanished. The 
divisions between the Salian and Ripaurian Franks, fundamental to the old 
Frankish kingdom of Clovis, were replaced by the patchwork Empire of 
Charlemagne. Frankia gave way in the east to the Holy Roman Empire, in 
the west to West Frankia. Charlemagne’s reforms on the mainland 
reintroduced the Roman system of jurisprudence to Gaul. Amongst the 
kingdoms of England, however, the Germanic method of trial persisted.33 It 
became known, in English courts, as the “wager of law.”34 This practice 
remained available as an option for the defense in some English claims as 
late as 1833.35 
Alongside trial by ordeal and battle, these were known as “methods of 
proof,” and they were seen not as competing narratives about how trials 
should be performed, but rather as equally potent ways to “prove” the 
truth.36 
                                                                                                                          
whether recourse was had to the jealously preserved right of private warfare, or whether the injured 
parties contented themselves with the more peaceful processes of [legal process] . . . .”). 
30 LEA, supra note 5, at 57–58. 
31 Id. 
32 Credo Norigaudum istum Eduensem episcopum vera jurasse, sicut me Deus adjuvet. HUGO 
FLAVINIAC, CHRONICON, LIBER II (author’s translation, likely 12th century). This is one of the simplest 
forms of oath-swearing. There are more elaborate examples, including the use of relics or bibles to 
guarantee the truthfulness of the oaths sworn or making use of long and particularly difficult to recall 
oaths that the oath-helper must swear without hesitation and without mistake in order to successfully 
purge the accusation. See, e.g., LEA, supra note 5, at 25–26; A.H.F. Lefroy, Anglo-Saxon Period of 
English Law, 26 YALE L.J. 291 (1916) (detailing some of the types and modes of compurgation). 
33 It did so along several other methods of proof—trial by ordeal and, after the coming of the 
Normans, trial by combat.  
34 This term was used only after the Norman Conquest. Black, supra note 4, at 513. 
35 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERICK WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 
BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 641 (2013). 
36 The proof of compurgation was that either that the act did not occur or that it should not be 
punished. The proof of trial by ordeal was the same, though God, rather than the community made that 
determination. See generally Ho, supra note 10. So, too, for trial by combat, which was seen to be the 
judgment of God for his chosen champion but may in fact be an outgrowth of the ancient Nordic 
practice of holmgang, the judicial duel between hazel branches in which the slanderer or insulter proves 
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The wager of law in the kingdoms of Great Britain has roots in Welsh 
as well as Anglo-Saxon practice.37 The oath-helping of Saxon thegns falls 
into this category of particularly English oaths, as distinguished from the 
Germanic oaths of the Continent.38 
As the importance of blood kinship withered with the growth of more 
powerful kingdoms, and particularly with the unification of Britain into a 
single polity outside of Wales and the far north,39 compurgation began to 
take on a new role.40 Compurgation in English Hundred Courts no longer 
had the same conciliatory role that it had served during the period of 
private justice that dominated the early Middle Ages. Indeed, 
compurgation began to be used as an alternative to other popular modes of 
proof.41 
The detachment from this earlier mode can be seen in the oath sworn 
by William, Bishop of Ely, in 1194. King Richard I of England, attempting 
to make peace between William and the Archbishop of York, required that 
William of Ely swear with a hundred priestly compurgators that he had 
neither caused nor desired the arrest of the archbishop.42 Of course, the 
samples of compurgations cited are from cases of extremely high-status 
parties. Unfortunately, high-status cases such as these may provide 
relatively little insight into the world at ground-level in the English 
hundred courts.43 Extant court rolls will have to be examined in much 
                                                                                                                          
his insult by defending it in combat. For a general description of holmgang, see Olav Bø, Hólmganga 
and Einvigi: Scandinavian Forms of the Duel, 2 MEDIEVAL SCANDINAVIA 132–48 (1969). 
37 ANOMALOUS LAWS, Book IX ch. v § 3, ch. xxxviii § 1 (articulating the rule that a man who 
suspected another of theft could go to him with a relic and in the presence of witnesses demand an oath 
of negation, a failure in which was a conviction of the crime imputed, without further trial).  
Further, Henry C. Lea contends that the Ostrogoths of Italy and the Visigoths of France and Spain 
were the only “barbarian” nations in whose codes the practice of compurgation has no place. LEA, 
supra note 5, at 28 (“On the other hand, the Salians, the Ripuarians, the Alamanni, the Baioarians, the 
Lombards, the Frisians, the Saxons, the Angli and Werini, the Anglo-Saxons, and the Welsh, races 
springing from origins widely diverse, all gave to this form of purgation a prominent position in their 
jurisprudence, and it may be said to have reigned from Southern Italy to Scotland.”). 
38 King’s thegns were an appointed position in the Saxon kingdoms of Great Britain, though shire 
thegns were simply great men who owned more than five hides of land and performed services for the 
king or local officials. A thegn’s oath was worth that of six villeins. WILLIAM STUBBS, LECTURES ON 
EARLY ENGLISH HISTORY 168 (Arthur Hassal ed., 1906). 
39 This unification was begun with the recognition of Æthelstan as the king of the English in 927 
C.E. by King Constantine of Scotland, King Hywel Dda of Deheubarth, Ealdred of Bamburgh, and 
King Owain of Strathclyde in the north of the island. N. J. HIGHAM, THE KINGDOM OF NORTHUMBRIA: 
AD 350–1100, at 190 (1993). 
40 LEA, supra note 5, at 57. 
41 In later codes, trivial offenses or small claims were often cured by the defendant’s oath, while 
more important classes of adjudication would require the summoning and sealing of purgators based 
on the degree of crime alleged. Id. at 50. 
42 ROGER DE HOVEDEN, 2 ANNALS OF ROGER DE HOVEDEN: COMPRISING THE HISTORY OF 
ENGLAND AND OF OTHER COUNTRIES OF EUROPE 322–23 (Henry T. Riley trans., 1853). 
43 Note that both of the examples provided were not kept in bureaucratic records or notes, but 
rather in annals, which, in the 12th century, were very similar to popular history today. 
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greater detail with this hypothesis in mind than they have been to date. For 
the purposes of this Note, I merely attempt to establish the existence of the 
information, not to categorize it in any systematic way. 
We find one John Fox the younger in the rolls of the court at Ely,44 
unable to produce the required number of oath-swearers: 
John of Elm plaintiff appears against John Fox the younger in 
a plea of trespass wherefore he carried off [nine] hundreds of 
his sedge and unjustly detains them from him. 
And the said John Fox comes and defends etc., and says that 
he carried off no sedge of the said John of Elm as he 
surmises against him, and this is he ready to defend against 
him in such wise as the court shall consider. And of this he 
has waged a law, and the said John of Elm has conceded him 
the said law, and the said John Fox has declined to make the 
law. Therefore it is considered that the said John of Elm do 
recover his sedge and that the said John of Fox be in mercy 
(3 d.);45 pledge, John of Elm.46 
From this record, we can see that compurgation was, at least in some 
way, effective. John Fox was unable or unwilling to bring together 
purgators to clear his name, and instead was levied a three pence fine. 
Though records like these can be somewhat opaque—we cannot, for 
example, tell whether or not John Fox the younger did indeed carry off the 
sedge, whether he was wealthy enough not to mind the fine, whether he 
asked others to be his purgators and was rebuffed, or a variety of other 
potential circumstances—we can certainly see that compurgation did not 
always result in the alleged wrongdoer being pardoned. 
But we cannot view this record alone. The Selden Society also 
preserved an interesting manual from the mid-13th century—the “Court 
Baron,” which contains instructions for a lord or bailiff in ordering his 
local court. These make-believe suits and crimes can serve to instruct us on 
the idealized practices of the period. Maitland dates this somewhere around 
1265 C.E., making it of much later mint than the early practices of 
                                                                                                                          
44 Ely was a large Fenland monastery before the Conquest, and later became the seat of an 
important bishopric. The court held there was that of the ecclesiastical lord, the Bishop of Ely. 
45 The “d” here mentioned is a dinar, a silver penny and the form of currency at the time, called 
pennies (hence the English plural “pence”). 
46 This pleading is from the period of 1285–1327, clearly after the passage of the Assize. 
However, since it is a civil pleading, the Assize of Clarendon would not have precluded the use of the 
wager of law here. This translation was made in the late 19th century by the editors of the Selden 
Society papers. 4 SELDEN SOCIETY I, The Bishop of Ely’s Court at Littleport, in THE COURT BARON  
123–24 (Frederic William Maitland & William Paley Baildon eds., 1890) [hereinafter THE COURT 
BARON]. 
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compurgation discussed above.47 The first type of form is the “hue 
levied,”48 namely that the peace has been disturbed. Once the case is 
described to the assembly and Richard is asked if he has heard (“Fair 
friend Richard, hast heard that which the bailiff hath counted against thee? 
Yea, sir.”),49 he is instructed that “this court awardeth that thou be at thy 
law six-handed at the next court against Robert and against his suit, to 
acquit thyself . . . .”50 
This formula is instructing Richard to produce six purgators by the 
next court date, generally a month away. Likewise, William Tailor is 
commanded to do the same in the charge of breach of the assize of beer (a 
criminal offense against the lord) in a later formula.51 Again, Robert 
Fisher, who sold fish in breach of the patent franchise of the town, was 
ordered to be at his law six-handed.52 So is Stephen Carpenter, for 
battering strangers.53 For a greater charge involving a number of people 
(A., B., C., and D.) the bailiff instructs them to be at their law twelve 
handed—i.e., producing twelve purgators.54 The same number goes for a 
man guilty of breaching the forest law and hunting on the lord’s land.55 
The manual contemplates that there will be those who cannot make their 
law by lack of the necessary purgators,56 or even through a confession,57 
thus placing them “in mercy” of their lord and the wronged party. 
The bailiff was also given instruction on how to carry out the 
“inquest,” or the manner of questioning both the parties to a suit and the 
pledges to a purgatory oath.58 This form of adjudication grew together with 
the so-called vicini questioned in these inquests: the use of neighbors as a 
special source of testimony in the world of Anglo-Saxon trial.59 These 
questions bear directly on the case. For example:  
Also it was inquired of the chief pledge whether he knew 
how many and whom he had in his tithing. And it was 
witnessed that he did, [but on reading] the names of the 
                                                                                                                          
47 Id. at 6. 
48 Id. at 20. 
49 Id. at 21. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 25. 
52 Id. at 27. 
53 Id. at 28. 
54 Id. at 31. 
55 Id. at 35. 
56 Id. at 58–60. 
57 Id. at 65. 
58 Id. at 71–73. 
59 Vicini were most prominent in issues of boundary-determination or conveyance of property. 
However, the use of local witness/jurors expanded to expressly cover the conception of justice as 
something essentially local and requiring the specialized knowledge of neighbors and peers. See 
Macnair, supra note 10, at 556–57. 
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several persons it is found that R. Smith has concealed N. 
and N. who have removed themselves into the land of the 
Preceptor of the Knights Templars. And it is commanded that 
they be distrained to return with their chattels to the lord’s 
land, and the said R. is in mercy, 2 s.,60 for the concealment.61  
We may gather from this formula that the chief puragtor was asked 
questions about the oath he swore and found wanting in his response. The 
result is a fine to the purgator himself. But both the proof offered in the 
form of the purgator’s oath and the counter-proof of the reading of the 
names, are forms of local and customary knowledge. The chief pledge 
himself offers his own knowledge of affairs to the court and the court 
consults a local record to confirm or deny it. 
Indeed, we may even witness the purgation bending back against the 
original accuser: “R. cometh against N. and maketh a law in the suit which 
was between them. And N. is in mercy, 3 s., for a false complaint; pledges 
N. and N.”62 In this formula, because R. managed to defend himself by 
producing oath-takers, N. was fined for a false complaint. Punishment of 
this kind relies on a local village-level calculus of interests. If R. was truly 
to blame, surely those with the most knowledge of the affair, the neighbors 
of both R. and N., would not swear against N. knowing that R. had done 
wrong. 
This is an idealized source from somewhere in the mid-12th century. It 
does not represent a record of actual cases. In a sense, this formulary is 
more telling than any individual case could ever be, such as that of John 
Fox presented above. The opacity of each individual recording in the case 
of real cases is here obliterated—the formulary describes exactly the 
various permutations that the bailiff should take. All potentially useful 
branches are recorded for the attentive reader, so that individuation of 
circumstance might not take him by surprise.63 
H. L. Ho warns us to ask the questions that medieval litigants would 
have asked, albeit in the context of the trial by ordeal: “If God accepts the 
proband by making him sink in cold water, is it because he is innocent? Or 
is the repentant being shown mercy?”64 Though he here refers to the 
                                                                                                                          
60 Presumably the “s” stands for shillings, a denomination of currency larger than a penny by a 
factor of twelve. 
61 THE COURT BARON, supra note 46, at 72. 
62 Id. at 76. 
63 For a practice that was supposedly done away with in the Assize of Clarendon, criminal 
compurgation seems alive and well in this ~1260ish formulary manual. Another surprising note is that 
this book was recopied throughout the 14th and 15th centuries. Indeed, Maitland hypothesized that it 
may have been copied as late as the 1600s.  
64 Ho, supra note 15, at 280; see also R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, THE BIRTH OF THE ENGLISH 
COMMON LAW 69 (1973) (“[I]n the twelfth century some authors interpreted the successful ordeal of a 
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ordeal, this could as easily be asked during a compurgation or wager of 
law; is the proband being granted a second chance? The functions of this 
judicial process are multifaceted, and can satisfy a number of sociological 
needs. 
The post-Conquest world was one in which private law was being 
transformed into professional law.65 Compurgation is the foremost of the 
forms of private law; indeed, it existed primarily as a method for the 
solution of private disputes that, as we have seen, might otherwise have 
ended in bloodshed. Still, it is important to remember that these images of 
compurgation exist across time and across a spectrum of changing social 
structures. No one example represents anything other than its own 
particular milieu. The sum total must be imagined along a continuum of 
praxis extending from the earliest Germanic compurgation until the time 
when it was wholly extinct in Britain. 
C.  The Vanishing of Compurgation 
Compurgation was more or less ended as a practice in the secular 
courts of England in the 12th century by the Assize of Clarendon.66 
Although ecclesiastical courts continued to practice compurgation, few 
common folk had access to them.67 There were, as mentioned above, a 
certain number of survivals that continued far into the 19th century in 
particular civil matters, but as a general mode of proof, it was no longer in 
use. 
The decline of compurgation as a mode of proof occurred around the 
same time as the rise of the jury trial. Coincidental or not, this alignment of 
events led a few scholars in the mid-19th century to conclude that the 
dying light of compurgation was taken up by the jury trial: that one 
essentially became the other. Of course, this has been debunked as 
spurious, or at least as resting on somewhat shaky ground. 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
known criminal as a measure of grace: God wanted to give the criminal another chance or to reward 
those who had confessed their sins to a priest and were then ‘salvati per confessionis virtutem.’”). 
65 Macnair, supra note 10, at 587–88. 
66 The Assize was promulgated under Henry II, and detailed restrictions on acceptable modes of 
trial. THE ASSIZE OF CLARENDON, supra note 7.  
However, as the popularity of the Court Baron shows, the difference between criminal and civil 
modes of trial was not yet clearly distinguished, and compurgation may have been available as a mode 
of trial or proof in criminal matters in the secular courts until well after Henry’s Assize of Clarendon 
was promulgated. 
67 Consistory courts were available only when the crime was one charged by the Church (such as 
blasphemy) or when any of the litigants were clerics. Even taking minor orders would allow someone 
to claim the protection of the Church, which was just one of many benefits to becoming a lay canon, an 
attractive route for many in the 12th century. 
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III. THE ROOTS OF JURY NULLIFICATION 
The medieval origins of the jury spring from that milieu and any 
resemblance of modern juries is very slight. Jurors were meant to be 
informed members of the local community, serving as both witnesses and 
determiners-of-fact.68 County or royal judges would charge them with 
settling cases, and settle cases they did: by using their own knowledge of 
them.69 The American fear of biased jurors never entered into the equation. 
What reads as bias to us read to the medievals as a firm basis for 
knowledge of the case at hand.70 It is easy to see the temptation of drawing 
an evolutionary line from compurgation to the jury because of all they have 
in common. Those who do fall into the same trap as the Victorian 
Medievalists.71 
The jury would seem to be the creation of the very same Assize of 
Clarendon which ended the wide-spread use of compurgation.72 However, 
                                                                                                                          
68 Of course, this depended on the type of proof being sought. Purgators, as seen above, could 
still be questioned like witnesses, and they served a role that was wholly unique from that of the 
traditional juror. Still, it is conceivable that the notion of knowing townsfolk who swear to the truth or 
falsehood of a claim may have developed into one requiring the court itself to produce these townsfolk 
as jurors, rather than each side in a case producing their own oath-takers.  
For example, the Synod of Toul in 838 resolved a boundary dispute not by empanelling a jury, 
but by “investigating by the testimony of many, clergy and lay, who appeared to be the older.” 
Macnair, supra note 10, at 562. This type of inquiry was known as an inquest, and it has many of the 
attributes of compurgation and jury trial admixed in different quantities depending on the time and 
place of the inquest. See Edmund M. Morgan, The Jury and the Exclusionary Rules of Evidence, 4 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 247, 247–48, 251 (1937) (describing the evolution of the inquest into the jury trial, but 
also noting that the common law preference for testimony of witnesses antedates the jury). 
These witnesses in the formal inquest made use of their own personal knowledge. Macnair, supra 
note 10, at 572. Macnair argues, convincingly, that the jury does not descend directly from communal 
judgments such as compurgation, but rather was intermediated by the use of formal vicini in the 
inquest-style adjudications, which themselves transmitted the notion of local custom as a mode of proof 
down to the later English jury. Id. at 587–88. 
For more on the inquest process in the English context, see Robin Fleming, Oral Testimony and 
the Domesday Inquest, 17 ANGLO-NORMAN STUD. 101 (1995). 
69 Macnair, supra note 10, at 562. 
70 “[T]o those small-scale societies which favour the kind of flexible face-to-face justice in which 
honor and personal reputation are intimately bound up with innocence and guilt, the kind of 
dispassionate inquiry into fact which we believe to constitute a higher form of jurisprudence will often 
seem . . . repugnant.” RICHARD FIRTH GREEN, A CRISIS OF TRUTH—LITERATURE AND LAW IN 
RICARDIAN ENGLAND 101–02 (Univ. of Pa. Press 1999). 
71 The most obvious positivist trap, of course, is teleological. We cannot help but find “growth,” 
“evolution,” and “progress” when we view the past through the lens of the present. Thankfully, though 
this methodology was widespread in Victorian history, Victorian legal scholarship seems to have 
escaped the brunt of it. Many of the late 19th century articles cited herein are very critical of this 
positivist viewpoint. 
72 A body of twelve of the more lawful men of each hundred had the duty of presenting under 
oath any person believed to be a robber, thief, murderer, or harborer of such criminals and to act as a 
sort of indicting grand jury in the interests of the king’s peace. This indicted grand jury is commonly 
cited as the genesis of the jury-trial in Anglo-American law. However, this narrative may be too simple. 
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its roots are sunk deep in the bedrock of the common law itself, which is 
demonstrated by such records as King William of Normandy journeying to 
Penden Heath in 1072 “in order to ascertain carefully from old Englishmen 
the truth of the law and to have a hearing there about some customs and 
lands . . . .”73 Indeed, the jury right of England has precedent in the Dicasts 
of Athens, the Judices of Rome, and in the customs of Danes, Lombards, 
Franks, Norwegians, Swedes and Scandinavians.74 
What, then, is the origin of jury nullification? Proponents trace jury 
nullification to a group of early 17th-century English cases.75 The division 
between the realms of act and law that all lawyers are familiar with was 
introduced in 1649 during the first trial of Lieutenant Colonel John 
Lilburne for treason.76 He was acquitted, but put on trial again in 1653 for 
criticizing the privileges of a member of Parliament.77 His defense was that 
the law criminalizing the expression of anti-government opinions was itself 
criminal.78 The jury agreed that the law was ultra vires, and released 
Lieutenant Colonel Lilburne.79  
Seventeen years later, the Quaker leaders William Penn and William 
Mead were arrested for sedition.80 In court, Penn argued, “[t]he question is 
not, whether I am guilty of this indictment, but whether this indictment be 
legal.”81 Four of the twelve jurors in Penn’s trial refused to convict him. 
The judge threatened the jurors, telling them “you shall be locked up 
without meat, drink, fire, and tobacco; you shall not think thus to abuse the 
court; we will have a verdict by the help of God, or you shall starve for 
it.”82 When the jury returned, it found Mead not guilty and Penn guilty of 
speaking sedition, but not to an unlawful assembly.83 The jury was sent out 
again. On its final return, the jury found both defendants not guilty.84 The 
                                                                                                                          
For example, Frankia already had an accusatory jury to act in the king’s interest long before the Assize. 
MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 121 (1913). 
73 1 ENGLISH LAWSUITS FROM WILLIAM I TO RICHARD I, at 14 (R.C. van Caenegem trans., 1990). 
74 Catherine K. Roselle, Origin of Trial by Jury, 16 WOMEN LAW. J. 4 (1928). Catherine Roselle 
went on to argue that the shiremoot of England, the regular judicial meeting of each shire, was the 
continuation of the ancient folkmoot in which something resembling trial by jury can be seen. Id. at 5. 
75 G. Frank Gormlie, Jury Nullification: History, Practice, and Prospects, 53 GUILD PRAC. 49, 51 
(1996). 
76 But, at that time, the jury was to judge both fact and law. Lileburne stated that the jurors “are in 
law judges of law as well as fact.” M. Creagon, Jury Nullification: Assessing Recent Legislative 
Developments, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1101, 1103 (1993). 
77 Phillip. B. Scott, Jury Nullification: An Historical Perspective on a Modern Debate, 91 W. VA. 
L. REV. 389, 401 (1989).  
78 Creagon, supra note 76, at 1104. 
79 Id. 
80 Scott, supra note 77, at 394. 
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judge fined each juror forty marks and ordered their imprisonment until the 
fine was paid.85 
Edward Bushell, one of the original four dissenting jurors and the jury 
foreman, filed a writ of habeas corpus. Chief Justice Vaughn wrote an 
opinion in Bushell’s Case, holding that a trial judge cannot evaluate how 
the jury sees the evidence and thus, jurors were beyond the penalty of 
perjury or contempt for making a finding that the judge did not agree 
with.86 Vaughn ordered that the jury: 
find for the plaintiff or defendant upon the issue to be tried, 
wherein they resolve both law and fact complicatedly, and 
not the fact by itself; so though they answer not singly to the 
question what is law, yet they determine the law in all 
matters where issue is joined. . . .87  
This bifurcation between law and fact, never before seen in medieval 
sources,88 heralds the rise of the jury’s power to nullify laws. Yet, it is still 
clearly an extension of the old common law system whereby local lay 
jurors acted as witnesses not only to the goings-on in the case, but to the 
law itself.89 This is a palpable tension between the power of the locality 
and the centralizing power of the state. By the 17th century, the notion of a 
nation-state had emerged, there was an understanding of state structure, 
and the centralization process that went back and forth through the 
Classical and Medieval periods had by now reached completely new 
heights.90 
Jury nullification, at least as presented by Justice Vaughn, is a 
completely opaque process and one in which the judiciary has no authority 
to pry. In the classical medieval English trial, local juror-witnesses and 
judges were exposed to charges of perjury if they delivered contested 
                                                                                                                          
85 Id. 
86 Bushell’s Case, (1670) 22 Charles II. 
87 Creagon, supra note 76, at 1106–07; Bushell’s Case at 1010, 1015–17. 
88 The more common medieval conception was that provided in the 1071 suit presented above. 
ENGLISH LAWSUITS, supra note 73.  
89 Id. 
90 Interestingly, the Magna Carta provides us with a look into the process of governmental 
centralization in the Middle Ages by the anti-government stance it takes. Throughout the late Classical 
and Medieval periods, every time a monarch attempted to accrue rights to him or herself, there was a 
strong backlash from the powerful elites that were left out of such a system. MAGNA CARTA, 1215, 
1199–1216 John Lackland. Charlemagne’s empire was created in the face of such anti-government 
backlash, but at a time when local lords still had to be confirmed by the king at Aachen to receive their 
titles, and were in fact ministerial appointments. Contrast the creation of the county system in Frankia 
in the 9th century (under which worthwhile underlings were appointed by the king to be counts) with 
the hatred of the royal representatives in England in the 11th and 12th centuries—the shire reeves, or 
sheriffs. 
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verdicts.91 Vaughn’s innovation in Bushell’s Case was to place the jury’s 
deliberation completely beyond the reach of the judiciary or any process of 
review.92 Of course, this is no longer the case in most Anglo-American 
courts, at least in civil cases. Jury verdicts can be overturned on stringent 
grounds of unreasonability. Yet, the guarantee of the jury-right under the 
United States Constitution93 makes it impossible for a United States judge 
or magistrate to displace the findings made by a jury in a criminal context. 
The modern U.S. criminal jury is just as protected from the ire of the judge 
as the jury in Bushell’s Case after Vaughn’s opinion. 
This practice was carried into American jurisprudence during the 
colonial period, when the power of the jury to nullify laws was seen to be 
an essential element of the criminal justice system.94 Justice Story, 
however, circumscribed the power of the jury in United States v. Battiste.95 
The “physical power to disregard the law” belonged to the jury, but Story 
thought that the jury should not follow its own interpretation of the law.96 
Still, in the wake of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act, juries continued to 
nullify.97 
IV. MODERNITY 
A.  The Connection of Vicinage 
Both jury nullification (indeed, the entire process of the jury trial) and 
the now-defunct adjudicatory process of compurgation spring from the 
same well: the importance of locality to justice. This is seen in the juror-
witness practice, which is tied inextricably to the practice of compurgation, 
as well as in the power of the 17th century jury (still composed mostly of 
peers and locals) to overturn unjust laws. The concept and requirement of 
vicinage embodies this powerful sentiment, and is usually associated with 
the modern notion of a jury of peers.98 
                                                                                                                          
91 “[O]aths were taken very seriously by medieval jurists. Perjury attended their violation; and the 
law concerning oaths, their consequences, and the circumstances in which they might be mitigated, was 
complex.” Elizabeth Makowski, Cloister Contested: Periculoso as Authority in Late Medieval Consilia, 
71 JURIST 334, 342 (2011) (citing RICHARD HELMHOLZ, THE SPIRIT OF CLASSICAL CANON LAW 167, 
172–73 (1996)); see also Michael D. Gordon, Invention of a Common Law Crime: Perjury and the 
Elizabethan Courts, 24 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 145, 146 (1980). 
92 Mark DeWolf Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582, 584 (1939). 
93 E.g., U.S. CONST. art. III., § 2. 
94 Howe, supra note 92. 
95 24 F. Cas. 1042 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835). 
96 Id. at 1043. 
97 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 110 (1998). 
98 The concept is drawn from 14th century Legal French and means roughly the local 
neighborhood, or place where the crime was committed. “Whereas venue refers to the locality in which 
charges will be brought and adjudicated, vicinage refers to the locality from which jurors will be 
drawn. . . . The vicinage concept requires that the jurors be selected from a geographical district that 
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As early as the 11th century, the English nobility considered trial by a 
jury of, not only peers, but peers selected from their vicinage, that is, from 
their County, to be an essential element of freedom.99 In 1774, trial by a 
jury of the vicinage was discussed by the Provincial Congress of North 
Carolina as “the only lawful inquest that can pass upon the life of a British 
subject.”100 The Continental Congress, declaring the inalienable rights of 
British Subjects to the inhabitants of Quebec, said:  
The next great right is that of trial by jury. This provides, that 
neither life, liberty or property, can be taken from the 
possessor until twelve of his unexceptional countrymen and 
peers of his vicinage, who from that neighborhood may 
reasonably be supposed to be acquainted with his character, 
and the characters of the witnesses, upon a fair trial and full 
enquiry, face to face in open Court, before as many of the 
people as chuse [sic] to attend, shall pass their sentence upon 
oath against him. . . .101 
Jury nullification has had a checkered history in American 
jurisprudence. A number of high-profile criminal cases have been resolved 
by a jury’s failure to convict even though the jurors believed the evidence 
against the defendants—the trials of Dr. Jack Kevorkian102 and Oliver 
North,103 for example. Yet, a debate rages in the American field of 
jurisprudence over whether juries should be informed of this power to 
                                                                                                                          
includes the locality of the commission of the crime, and it traditionally mandates that such district not 
extend too far beyond the general vicinity of that locality.” WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 738–39 (2d ed. 1992). 
99 We can confidently make this assessment because it is one of the rights that Magna Carta 
guarantees. MAGNA CARTA, 1215, 1199–1216 John Lackland. However, it was immaterial to those 
barons whether this guarantee had its origin in the Great Charter or “whether, as is more probable, it 
existed before and was, by the Charter, secured against Royal influence.” Henry G. Connor, 
Constitutional Right to a Trial by a Jury of the Vicinage, 4 U. PA. L. REV. & AM. L. REGIS 197, 198 
(1908–09). 
100 North Carolina Convention, Aug. 27, 1774, reproduced in Connor, supra note 99.  
101 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 107 (1774). 
102 Dr. Kevorkian was charged with violating Michigan’s ban on assisted suicide. There was 
uncontroverted evidence that he helped the decedent inhale carbon monoxide, but he was acquitted by a 
Detroit jury. JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY 65 (1994). 
103 In 1989, a federal jury acquitted Oliver North of nine of the twelve charges against him, 
regardless of uncontroverted evidence supporting them. See George Lardner, Jr., North Guilty on 3 
Counts in Iran-Contra Affair: Ex-NSC Aide Is Acquitted on 9 Charges, WASH. POST, May 5, 1989, at 
A1, A10–11. North was only convicted on the charges in which he acted alone and was acquitted on all 
charges that he was ordered by superiors to perform, notwithstanding the jury instruction that it was not 
a defense that North acted under the direction of his superiors. See ABRAMSON, supra note 106, at 66–
67. 
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nullify.104 Many scholars decry the practice of jury nullification as an 
inherently uncontrollable power that saps the life of the judicial system.105 
The very notion of jury nullification is currently in disfavor, particularly 
because it is so unassailable.106 There is nothing that can be done to 
impeach a jury’s verdict under the procedure of Anglo-American criminal 
law short of the allegation of some kind of illegal impropriety with the jury 
itself.107 
A number of arguments have been advanced against jury nullification 
over the last decade, though there is a considerable literature defending it 
as well.108 However, each of these arguments necessarily is uninformed as 
to the various upwellings of social pressure that gave birth to similar 
systems—of vicinage and compurgation—in the medieval past. By 
examining jury nullification in its proper setting, as one of a long line of 
locality-embracing judicial procedures, we can make a determination as to 
its worth with the long and weather gaze of history to assist us. 
Those who defend the use of jury nullification tend to use language 
very similar to those examining the locality-driven procedures of 
compurgation. “[T]he jury disperses and decentralizes authority.”109 “Its 
existence constitutes one of the strongest guarantees of civil liberty and due 
process. In trial by jury, the people judge between the State and the 
                                                                                                                          
104 See Alan W. Scheflin & Jon M. Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: Contours of a Controversy, 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55 (1980) (“The critical issue… has become whether the defendant has the 
right to have the jury instructed as to its universally-recognized power.”). 
105 See, e.g., Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REV. 253 (1996) 
(arguing that the procedural safeguards given to jury nullification make it one that should be jettisoned, 
particularly because of the lack of such civil safeguards as special verdicts, judgment as a matter of 
law, and the appeals process in the criminal context). 
106 Ernest T. Lindberg, Speaking of Ethics: Jury Nullification Arguments, 17 WASH. LAW. 14, 14 
(2003). 
107 Travis Hreno, Necessity and Jury Nullification, 20 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 351, 351 (2007). 
Nevertheless, there are a number of articles arguing in favor of jury nullification. See, e.g., Michael E. 
Korte, He Did It but So What—Why Permitting Nullification at Court-Martial Rightfully Allows 
Members to Use Their Consciences in Deliberations, 223 MIL. L. REV. 100 (2015); Jeffrey Abramson, 
Four Models of Jury Democracy, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 861 (2015). 
108 It would be pointless to marshal all the arguments on either side here, particularly as they will 
be expounded upon in the sections below. The most powerful, of course, are those that remind us of the 
overwhelming power of the elite in a locality to decriminalize truly atrocious behavior, such as the 
refusal of juries in the South to find white men guilty of crimes against black men or women during the 
Civil Rights movement or other impermissible systematic abuses of jury nullification. But see Paul 
Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 
677 (1995) (discussing how federal prosecutors often lose cases that they should win when black jurors 
refuse to convict black defendants and suggesting that because the lines of racial bias were arrayed 
against black defendants, this may actually serve as a balance on other, ingrained social iniquities). 
109 The Jury in Criminal Trials 16-17 (Law Reform Comm’n of Canada, Working Paper No. 27, 
1980). 
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accused, and the State has little or no control over the outcome.”110 The 
notion of the jury as a counterbalance to the impersonal power of the state 
squares with fear or distrust of an uninterested authority figure that later 
medieval courts despised. While the origins of compurgation lie in an age 
when there was little or no central authority at all, it certainly adapted to be 
a counterweight against royal and baronial influence in England.111 
B.  The Argument Against Nullification 
Arguments against nullification are many and varied. Many center 
around the costs of a nullificatory program to the “truth-seeking” 
process,112 though this is but one of many “costs” presented by 
nullification’s detractors. Even more than legal scholars, the American 
judiciary itself is in opposition to the concept of jury nullification and has 
codified that opposition into law.113 
The Supreme Court explicitly held, in Standefer v. United States,114 
that the jury may “acquit out of compassion or compromise or because of 
their ‘assumption of a power which they had no right to exercise . . . .’”115 
The Second Circuit agreed in 1997.116 This principle is expressed by 
preventing the judge from instructing a jury that it may nullify.117 The New 
York Bar Association’s Committee on Professional Responsibility traced 
this belief to Sparf and Hansen v. United States.118 Notwithstanding this, 
the Bar Association of New York decided that “a lawyer may, consistent 
with ethical rules, appeal for jury nullification if not prohibited by the 
                                                                                                                          
110 CHRISTOPHER GRANGER, THE CRIMINAL JURY TRIAL IN CANADA 8 (2nd ed. 1996). Though 
both of these sources speak to the Canadian criminal jury, they echo the very same sentiments that 
animate the defense of the American criminal jury system, that the jury is a bastion of liberty. 
111 For this argument, see supra Part I. 
112 Hreno points this out in Necessity and Jury Nullification, listing three general arguments 
forwarded by opponents of nullification, namely: 1) nullification is unnecessary because it is 
preventable, 2) nullification can be prevented practically, and 3) nullification is not a conceptual 
necessity. Although he rejects arguments 2 and 3, he is somewhat hesitant about rejecting the first out 
of hand. Still, because he believes nullification cannot be prevented practically and, more importantly, 
that it is a conceptual necessity of the jury trial, he is one of the rare critics to side in its favor. The 
implication, of course, is that if nullification can be prevented it should be. Hreno, supra note 107, at 
351–52. 
113 AMAR, supra note 97, at 110. 
114 447 U.S. 10 (1980). 
115 Id. at 22 (emphasis added). 
116 United States. v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 614 (2d Cir. 1997) (declaring jury nullification to be a 
violation of the juror’s oath to apply the law as instructed by the court). 
117 United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1133–35 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
118 Report on Jury Nullification, 54 RECORD OF THE ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW 
YORK 197, 199, citing Sparf, 151 U.S. 51, 106 (1895) (in which the Supreme Court ruled that juries do 
not have the right to judge and decide the law, the court instructed the jury that it “could not, 
consistently with the law arising from the evidence, find the defendants guilty of manslaughter, or of 
any offense less than the one charged”). 
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Court.”119  
Critics also warn that jurors’ motives are inscrutable—they may be 
moved by “caprice or unprincipled favoritism,”120 like the southern juries 
who refused to convict white defendants who victimized blacks in the face 
of extremely good evidence.121 Indeed, scholar Gary Simson warned that 
the difference between mercy and revenge was a distinction without 
principal and that jury nullification is a dangerous anachronism.122 
Research evidence exists that suggests jurors do sometimes disregard 
the application of the law because they see it as unfair.123 There is also 
experimental evidence that tends to show informing juries of their power to 
nullify would increase the instances of nullification, one of the stated fears 
of nullification critics.124 They fear that this will encourage jurors to ignore 
the law altogether and give them the excuse to exercise their personal 
prejudices and biases.125 
These arguments are powerful. The machinery of the state can often be 
used to protect the rights of those the community seeks to ostracize, 
degrade, or endanger.126 Yet, a powerful state cannot remain unchecked in 
its centralization of powers, particularly those that touch on such an 
important local issue as justice. For justice is rarely the concern of an entire 
country or state—rather, it is an intensely local and communal concern. 
This represents the danger, the keystone or crux between the legitimate 
aspects of community concern and the illegitimate ones of prejudice and 
bias. 
How, then, can the jury be saved? If it is stripped of its power to 
nullify, it will lose its ability to respond to community concern. If it is 
                                                                                                                          
119 Id. at 204 (emphasis added). 
120 Irwin A. Horowitz et al., Jury Nullification: Legal and Psychological Perspectives, 66 BROOK. 
L. REV. 1207, 1210 (2000). 
121 See, e.g., JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF 
DEMOCRACY 111–12 (1994); W. William Hodes, Lord Brougham, the Dream Team, and Jury 
Nullification of the Third Kind, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1075, 1090, 1096–97 (1996). 
122 Gary J. Simson, Jury Nullification in the American System: A Skeptical View, 54 TEX. L. REV. 
488, 516 (1976). 
123 Horowitz et al., supra note 120, at 1230–31 (citing the study by Saul M. Kassin & Samuel R. 
Sommers, Inadmissible Testimony, Instructions to Disregard, and the Jury: Substantive Versus 
Procedural Considerations, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1046, 1049 (1997)). 
124 Id. at 1232–36 (“When juries were instructed that they could determine both facts and law, 
there was a rationality to their decision making. That is, they were merciful when the community would 
be merciful and the law would not (the euthanasia scenario) and they were severe when the community 
might be expected to be severe, even when the law made conviction on the most severe charge rather 
difficult.”). See generally Irwin A. Horowitz, The Effect of Jury Nullification Instructions on Verdicts 
and Jury Functioning in Criminal Trials, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 25 (1985). 
125 Horowitz et al., supra note 120, at 1238. Still, the authors noted in their conclusion that “there 
will be instances in which justice may be better served by men and women departing from the strict 
letter of the law.” Id. at 1248. 
126 E.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). 
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granted the power to nullify without principal, it will expose criminal 
defendants to arbitrary (or worse, actually prejudicial) judgment. 
C.  Jury Nullification and the Anglo-American Wellspring 
Though Justice Story announced the death of the wager of law in 
American jurisprudence,127 the concept of localized justice performed by 
the community has not died out in American law. Indeed, it was 
transmitted through different channels, making its way down to the modern 
trial. The social forces that gave rise to the practice of compurgation may 
be gone,128 but the concerns that animated the public performance and 
community involvement remain. That is, we still require the law to 
conform to what the community believes to be right.129 
Our modern conception of the law has been shaped by the great 
assemblies and legislatures of Europe, as well as the philosophers of the 
Enlightenment. We are taught that law is something magisterial, 
descending from a powerful state.130 However, though law may be 
promulgated from the top of the state downwards, such as the onerous and 
much-hated forest laws of the Normans,131 much of the basic functions of 
                                                                                                                          
127 “Now, whatever may be said upon the question, whether the wager of law was ever introduced 
into the common law of our country by the emigration of our ancestors, it is perfectly clear that it 
cannot, since the establishment of the State of Tennessee, have had a legal existence in its 
jurisprudence. The constitution of that State has expressly declared, that trial by jury shall remain 
inviolate; and the constitution of the United States has also declared, that in suits at common law, 
where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved. 
Any attempt to set up the wager of law, would be utterly inconsistent with this acknowledged right. So 
that the wager of law, if it ever had a legal existence in the United States, is now completely 
abolished.” Childress v. Emory, 8 U.S. 642, 674–75 (1823). 
128 The strong factionalism that gave rise to the need for a balance between kin-groups cannot 
exist in the modern state. Family power has been sufficiently tempered to extinguish the possibility of 
the blood feud. Centralization of power and the creation of a new type of state has effectively quashed 
the kind of dangerous kin-groupings that threatened the stability of early medieval society. 
129 Indeed, this is the basis of the Anglo-American notion of the common law, which is a law 
descended from that ascertained by inquest from the medieval communities and villages. When a local 
bailiff wanted to know what the punishment for a crime was, he inquired of the community. Frank I. 
Schechter, Popular Law and Common Law in Medieval England, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 274 (1928) 
(“The average litigating Englishman of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries . . . would seek protection in 
the local, rather than the royal courts in almost every conceivable situation requiring civil 
redress . . . .”); see also JENKS, EDWARD PLANTAGENET 218 (1902) (“The conception of the Crown, as 
the sole fountain of justice, is a very modern conception in legal history.”). 
130 See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651). 
131 The Normans, like most continental aristocracy, enjoyed hunting game. In order to do so, 
game preserves were required. These preserves existed on the continent at the time of the Norman 
Invasion, but were not part of the Anglo-Saxon or Norse heritage that was fostered throughout England. 
After the coming of William the Conqueror, the forest laws established private royal forests wherein 
hunting by any except the king (or those with patents of the king) were prohibited. Margaret L. 
Bazeley, The Extent of the English Forest in the Thirteenth Century, 4 TRANSACTIONS ROYAL HIST. 
SOC’Y 140 (1921).  
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the English and continental law courts grew from community law—that is, 
sprang up from below.132 
V. CONCLUSION 
Although Victorian commentators often misunderstood the nature of 
the relationship between compurgation and the jury trial, it should be 
apparent that the existence of that relationship cannot now be denied. It is 
particularly important in Anglo-American law because of the efforts 
through which the vicinage concept, inherent in compurgation, were 
carried into the future—that is, by allowing the locality to have input on 
judgment delivered. This notion has survived colonization and transplant, 
and distrust of outsiders, founded as it was in the bloody times of the late 
Classical period, is still the norm in Anglo-American jurisdictions.133 The 
government should be wary of this power, or at least be prepared to follow 
the popular will if it cannot sway it. 
Like any system, that of nullification is open to abuse. The excesses of 
Southern juries during the Civil Rights era have painted it with a lasting 
stain. However, the right to the judgment, not just of a jury but of the 
community in which a crime or wrong was committed, is one that has been 
guaranteed since the dawn of our legal system in the dim ages when the 
ancient Brythonic, Germanic, Grecian, Italic and Scythian laws comingled 
in the cauldron of the ancient world. It inheres in our very notion of what it 
means to be just—since the earliest days of European law, it has been 
critical to our ancestors that they be judged not by an uncaring and 
uninvolved arbiter, but by the very people who knew them. 
Indeed, the guarantee of the criminal jury trial, enshrined in both 
Magna Carta and the American Constitution, requires, by its very nature, 
the promise that the jury may decide on whatever grounds it pleases. This 
is not a flaw of justice, but rather one of its essential characteristics as it 
was originally conceived by the European world. Any attempt to eradicate 
the power of jury nullification would be to remove the last vestige of 
vicinage, of being judged not by the state, but by knowing peers, that 
                                                                                                                          
This represents just one of many types of law that did not bubble up from below, but rather was 
imposed by the elite for an elite purpose. Many others could be cited, from coinage reforms to the 
Dioceltian laws restricting trade. See, e.g., Salvatore Riccobono, Outlines of the Evolution of Roman 
Law, 7 LOY. L.J. 159 (1926). 
132 A continental example of this would be Roman contract law, which evolved to assist 
commercial dealings but was not imposed in the same sense as the forestry laws were in England. 
Melius de Villiers, The Roman Contract According to Labeo, 35 YALE L.J. 292 (1925–26); Max Radin, 
Roman Law of Quasi-Contract, 23 VA. L. REV. 241 (1936); Ernst Freund, Contract and Consideration 
in Roman Law, 2 COLUM. L.T. 167 (1889). 
133 This was true in the original, medieval context as well. Engagement with the powerful warrior-
authorities of the medieval world were much different than wandering into a judge. Self-help may not 
have been available save for when a large number of families to agree to expunge the character trait. 
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remains in Anglo-American law. 
As the conception of the jury shifts further and further away from that 
of an informed panel in order to protect and insulate criminal defendants 
from bias and prejudice, it imperils the very purpose of the jury trial. There 
must, of course, be a certain level of protection from the vicissitudes of the 
capricious jury, but at the end of the day, it is the community to which the 
enforcement of law has been entrusted. The only way to repair a deficiency 
in this process is to repair the deficient community itself, else we risk 
stripping the counterbalancing power of the locality from the law 
altogether. 
The old rite of compurgation lives anew in nullification. It was not an 
inexplicable aberration of a barbarous time, but rather an embodiment of 
the necessity of community judgment when the state is weak. This anti-
centralizing force in criminal jurisprudence is the bedrock of English and 
American jurisprudence. Let us, then, not replace one kind of king with 
another when it comes to the criminal courtroom. Let us cease to seek for 
ways to stamp out nullification, and come to understand it for what it is, 
not what we fear it to be. 
 
 
 
